Frank Chavez vs The Firm

Republic of the Philippines

Republic
of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Manila




FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
Complainant,




– versus – I.S. No. XVI-INV-10E-00143 For: LIBEL under Article 353 Revised Penal Code




ALEJANDRO ALFONSO E. NAVARRO,
F. ARTHUR L. VILLARAZA, AVELINO J.
CRUZ, JR., SIMEON V. MARCELO,
RAOUL R. ANGANGCO, DAXIM L. LUCAS,
and PERGENTINO B. BANDAYREL, JR.
Respondents.

x————————————————————–x

CONSOLIDATED

REPLY-AFFIDAVIT

Under
oath, I, FRANCISCO
I. CHAVEZ, with
the same personal circumstances and address set forth in my
Complaint-Affidavit, by way of Consolidated Reply-Affidavit to the
Counter-Affidavits of respondents Villaraza, Cruz, Marcelo, Angangco
and Navarro, state:

DAMAGED
GOODS WON’T SELL

Unethical
conduct as lawyers; corrupting the judicial system

_____________________

1. In
his early morning TV show “Umagang Kay Ganda,” on May 20, 2010,
TV host Anthony Taberna minced no words in describing the IRREPARABLY
DAMAGED REPUTATION
of the so-called “The Firm” on national television:

“xxx
ISA
PONG OPEN SECRET SA LEGAL COMMUNITY KUNG PAANO PO HUMAHATAW ANG THE
FIRM MULA PO SA PISKALYA HANGGANG SA HUSGADO,
at kung ito po ang inyong kalaban maghanap ka na ng iyong
tatakbuhan. ITO
PO MARAHIL ANG DAHILAN KUNG BAKIT KARAMIHAN SA MGA MAHISTRADO NG
KORTE SUPREMA AY PUMAYAG ITALAGA NI PANGULONG ARROYO SI CHIEF
JUSTICE RENATO CORONA KAHIT MEDYO ALANGANIN SA KONSTITUSYON.
Ayon po sa aking mga, Deo pahiram lang ha, ayon sa aking mga bubwit
sa Supreme Court, eh AYAW
PO NILA NA MAGING AMA NG HIDIKATURA ANG DATING BOSSING NG THE FIRM.
Kung nais po ng The Firm na alisin ang ating pangamba, mabuti nga
pong siguro’y huwag silang tumanggap ng anumang pwesto sa
administrasyong Aquino, SAWA
NA PO KAMI SA TILA SINDIKATO SA PANAHON NI PANGULONG ARROYO NA ANG
MGA TRANSAKSYON AY KINAMADA NG MUKHANG MGA SANTO’T SANTA PERO SA
TOTOO PALA AY MAFIA.”

(The
Godfather theme playing in background)

“The
Firm” must have accepted the validity and accurateness of Taberna’s
assessment of “The Firm’s” reputation tattered by its main
partners themselves: Villaraza, Cruz, Marcelo, and Angangco. They
neither questioned Taberna nor sued him for libel. In fact, two of
them (Angangco and Navarro) submitted it as part of their
counter-affidavits. Indeed, brilliance fades, stupidity never.

Influence
peddling

2. Respondent
Marcelo admitted on air over radio DZMM, while being interviewed by
Mr. Ted Failon in the morning of May 20, 2010, that he talked to
Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio to influence the outcome of a
case. Is this not “influence peddling” and “transactional
litigation,” considering that Carpio was a founding partner of the
now so-called “The Firm?”

Arrogance
of Power

3. Respondent
Marcelo called Special Prosecutor Wendell B. Sulit some time after
the May 10, 2010 elections to ask her if Dennis Villa-Ignacio would
be acceptable as Ombudsman (despite the fact that there is an
incumbent) and to tell her that “The Firm” is going for the
impeachment of Supreme Court Chief Justice Corona. Confirmatory of
this is the Sworn Statement dated 02 July 2010 (copy attached hereto
as Annex
“A”)
of Special Prosecutor Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit. In his telephone
conversation with Special Prosecutor Sulit, respondent Marcelo reeked
with arrogance of power:

“5. That
after exchange of pleasantries, Ombudsman Marcelo asked me if
it’s okay now for him to come back as the Ombudsman
after “Mercy’s term is over,” referring to the present
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, and if
it is not possible anymore, perhaps it may be Dennis M.
Villa-Ignacio,
our former Special Prosecutor, or
maybe Atty. Arno Sanidad
and as for him (Ombudsman Marcelo) he can opt
for the JBC.
So I even asked him why he would like SP Villa-Ignacio to be
Ombudsman when he (Ombudsman Marcelo) was in the past endorsing SP
Villa-Ignacio to become the Supreme Court Chief Justice. He told
me as the reason why he endorsed SP Villa-Ignacio’s application as
Supreme Court Chief Justice is that ‘ginagago
lang namin ang JBC kasi naman si Corona ang gagawin Chief Justice,
i-impeach namin yan.’
xxx.” (Emphases supplied)

Mocking
and trifling with the JBC nomination process

______________________

In
that conversation, respondent Marcelo obviously bragged about
becoming Ombudsman again, pushing for men of his choice to become
Ombudsman, opting to be a JBC (Judicial and Bar Council) member as if
he and “The Firm” had control over the appointing power. Marcelo
told Special Prosecutor Sulit that he endorsed Dennis Villa-Ignacio
for the position of Chief Justice because ――

“GINAGAGO
LANG NAMIN (obviously referring to ‘The Firm’) ANG JBC KASI
NAMAN SI CORONA ANG GAGAWIN CHIEF JUSTICE, IIMPEACH NAMIN (meaning
‘The Firm’) YAN.”
(Emphases supplied)

Respondent
Marcelo and other respondents members of “The Firm” could get,
and should be, DISBARRED for making a mockery of the nomination
process of the JBC. The power and influence that respondents savored
during the Ramos and Arroyo governments must have really percolated
their brains for even pushing for Chief Justice Corona’s
impeachment simply because their founding partner Antonio Carpio was
unable to obtain the appointment. Shameless!

Supporting
a corrupt and repressive government

______________________

4. During
the time when respondents Cruz and Marcelo served Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (Cruz as Presidential Legal Counsel and Secretary of National
Defense, while Marcelo as Solicitor General and Ombudsman) they gave
advice to and protected the anomalous, corrupt and oppressive actions
of GMA and her husband. Respondents Cruz and Marcelo (with the
assistance of the other respondents members of “The Firm”, which
has publicly announced that it has been counsel for the First Couple
since 1984), provided legal cover, protection, advice on: the IMPSA
Power Plant scandal, the use of road funds maintenance for election
purposes, the Jose Pidal scandal, the Bolante fertilizer fund scams,
massive cheating and cover-up in the 2004 elections, the “Hello
Garci” tapes, the Comelec automation machines, the ZTE-NBN scandal,
the rigged bidding of infrastructure projects reported by the World
Bank, Executive Order No. 464 (a gag order to government officials in
the Executive Department to suppress the truth), Proclamation No.
1017 (granting emergency powers to GMA in an attempt to seize more
political power and further oppress the people), calibrated
preemptive response (suppressing legitimate public demonstrations),
to cite a few. It is obvious that respondents and “The Firm”
propped up, supported and protected a corrupt and repressive
President.

Protecting
clients while in public office

___________________

5. Respondent
Marcelo took advantage of his position as Ombudsman to protect his
and “The Firm’s” clients. To cite but two of such instances of
abuse of power and protection of “The Firm’s” clients ――

a) In
January 2004, the Supreme Court declared the Mega Pacific automatic
machine deal null and void as it was tainted with corruption. The
Supreme Court further ordered Ombudsman Marcelo to file criminal
charges against the true and real owner of Mega
Pacific.
Marcelo refused to file charges against Mega Pacific because it is
reportedly a client of “The Firm” and Mega Pacific owner Pedro
Tan is a major supplier of paper products to the Comelec and
reportedly a “compadre” of Marcelo ―― a fact Marcelo
deliberately suppressed from the public.

b) Complaints
for tax credit scam filed with the Ombudsman against executives of
the oil firm Shell
were never touched by Marcelo because Shell
is a client of “The Firm.

Protecting GMA,
Jocjoc Bolante, et al.

____________________

6. In
May and June 2004, I filed four (4) plunder charges against Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (GMA), Jocjoc Bolante, Cito Lorenzo, et al. on the
fertilizer fund scams, “Oplan Mercury” and unlawful use of OWWA
funds. Marcelo never touched these charges.

Lechon
de Villaraza, lección corruptos para los jóvenes abogados

_______________________

6.a) Just
less than three months ago (April 2010), “The Firm” was tasked
to show cause why it should not be cited for contempt for sending a
lechon
to a court on the occasion of that court’s Christmas party. “The
Firm,” counsel for the plaintiff in a case pending before said
court (MeTC Manila, Branch 20) admitted having sent the lechon.

In
a 28-page Order
dated 22 April 2010 (copy attached hereto as Annex
“L”),
the court vehemently castigated and berated the lawyers of “The
Firm” before the entire court staff.

6.b) The
court was direct and clear in giving “The Firm” a heavy
reprimand. The court’s reminder of “The Firm’s” wrongdoing
was very emphatic. The court said: “You know it is very wrong,
it is very wrong; if a court has no policy against it, you know it’s
wrong. A lechon
is not a moderate gift or insignificant one and it is not even a
token.” The court also gave “The Firm” a scathing reminder
that “the only thing that binds us is that case (Civil Case No.
186568), we are not even friends. “

6.c) Respondents
must be training their lawyers quite early on how to be influence
peddlers and to maneuver the outcome of cases they handle. This
prompted the court to say:

“Yes,
that
is degrading, a clear disrespect to the authority of this Court
considering that you were already informed that the court does not
accept gifts from litigants and then you still sent that gift, my
goodness.
You are degrading the authority of the Court. I provide for my
staff you do not have to send lechon
for
this court, my goodness.

xxx xxx xxx

And
as a matter of fact I take note of the fact that you are just a
new lawyer and my initial reaction is that ― how
come you can do this at this early stage of your career?
Is that how bad your idea of the judiciary is?”

Finally,
the court handed a stern admonition to “The Firm”— a lesson as
current as the need for good governance and an ethical judiciary.
Addressing “The Firm”, the court said:

“If
you (‘The Firm’) want an ethical judiciary you yourself (‘The
Firm’) should be circumspect in your actions.”

Gross
misconduct as lawyers; breeding a culture of impunity

____________________

7. Legal
circles are abuzz with reliable reports that a case for gross
misconduct as lawyers
was filed two (2) months ago against all the partners of “The Firm”
and three (3) associates namely: Avelino
I. Cruz, Jr., F. Arthur I. Villaraza, Simeon V. Marcelo, Raoul R.
Angangco, Sylvette Y. Tankiang, Elma Christine R. LeogArdo,
Bienvenido I. Somera, Jr., Alejandro Alfonso E. Navarro, Joe Nathan
P. Tenefrancia, Augusto A. San Pedro, Jr., Manuel L. Manaligod, Jr.,
Susan D. Villanueva, Patricia A. O. Bunye, Rodel A. Cruz, Aida
Araceli G. Roxas-Rivera, Thea T. Daep, Jonh Jerico L. Balisnomo,
Miguel U. Silos, Elmar G. Galacio, Rosa Mitchele C. Bagtas, Divina
Gracia C. Pedro, Franchette M. Acosta, Aldrich Fitz U. Dy, Jean
Jacquelyn A. de Castro and
Jonathan T. Pampolina.

The
case was provoked when “The Firm” sent a private
letter handcarried to
a judge in Bacolod City asking the judge to dismiss the case —
even
as “The Firm” has not formally entered its appearance as counsel
for any of the defendants.
On the basis of an unauthorized opinion of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Makati City, “The Firm” insisted that the
judge should dismiss the case because the sheriff of Bacolod City did
not have authority to serve summonses on defendants in Makati City —
a deliberate ploy or a clear case of ignorance of the law. The
opinion of the clerk of court and ex-oficio sheriff of Makati City
was attached to “The Firm’s” private letter to the judge with
the obvious purpose of influencing the judge to dismiss the case.
“The Firm” has not filed Answer to the Complaint despite the
lapse of time to do so — another clearly disbarrable omission.

Complainant’s
civic and social duty

____________________

So
where then is the “good reputation” of “The Firm” that
deserves protection from the law? Respondents are doing an
inimitably splendid job destroying the “reputation” of their own
law office. Considering the highly questionable acts of respondents
(and at least one other founding partner during the Ramos
Administration) during the GMA administration, it was in discharge of
my social and civic duty to stop respondents Cruz and Marcelo from
wiggling themselves in again in the corridors of power in the Noynoy
Aquino government.

The
Antecedents

8. When
Fidel Ramos became President in 1992, one of “The Firm’s”
founding partners, Antonio Carpio, was appointed Presidential Legal
Counsel. That was when abuse of power and influence-peddling began.

9. In
the Oriental Petroleum proxy fight (circa 1992 – 1993) between
Robert Coyiuto (who I represented, with much regret) and Alfonso
Yuchengco (represented by “The Firm”), reliable complaints
reached us that Carpio applied the squeeze play on certain
stockholders/directors of Oriental Petroleum to obtain their proxies
in favor of Yuchengco. For those who capitulated, the proxies ended
up in the hands of Arthur Villaraza ─ partner of Carpio in “The
Firm.” Consequently, my partner, UP Law Professor Jose C. Laureta,
sought the assistance of then House Speaker Jose de Venecia to verify
the reports. The Speaker requested Carpio to go to his (de
Venecia’s) house in Dasmariňas Village, Makati City. Present at
that meeting were Laureta, de Venecia, Coyiuto, Carpio and myself.
In the presence of everybody, I confronted Carpio about the
illegality and unfairness of his and Villaraza’s squeeze play in
the proxy fight. As a government official, Carpio was intervening
for a case being handled by his law firm. The exchanges between
Carpio and me became heated and reached a point when I stood up in
front of him expecting a physical confrontation with him. I stood my
ground standing but Carpio remained frozen in his seat. Despite the
underhanded tactics of “The Firm,” we won that proxy fight. I
realized only later that Carpio does not fight frontally. He fights
in some other ways.

10. In
subsequent months, our firm had another encounter with “The Firm”
in the Chemphil fight between brothers Antonio Garcia (represented by
“The Firm”) and Ramon Garcia (represented by our law office). It
was an SEC case and our law firm secured a temporary restraining
order (TRO) by virtue of which we took over the building and premises
of Chemphil located along Pasay Road, Makati City.

11. Our
client was in position at the company premises for about a week.
Then, when nobody was looking at the break of dawn one morning ―
again upon the obvious intervention of a top Malacaňang official ―
a composite team of policemen and soldiers, ably emboldened by the
support of a war tank, retook the Chemphil premises. Of course,
there was no resistance because the assault was effected with
superior strength, stealth, cover of dawn and because those who could
have resisted were not around.

12.
After quite some time following these two incidents, an undated
issue of “Smart File” (Smart File, for brevity) designated only
as “Animal Farm Series 028 and 029” was published and circulated
extensively. The publication which heaped upon me all sorts of
garbage and dirt obviously designed to destroy my good name, was
written by a certain Ricardo Manapat, reportedly a close associate of
then Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio Carpio.

13. I
sued Manapat for libel, with at least one John Doe reserved for
Carpio. Although I was then a resident of Muntinlupa City, I decided
to file the case with the City Prosecutor of Manila because I
exercised the option of filing the libel charge in the place where
the questioned publication was printed and first published. At that
time, Smart File indicated its address at Intramuros, Manila. The
City Prosecutor of Manila found probable cause and accordingly filed
the Information for libel against Manapat and John Does before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The accused moved to quash the
warrants for their arrest. When the court denied their motion, the
accused went to the Court of Appeals. The said court eventually
issued a decision in favor of the accused. At that time, Carpio was
still the Presidential Legal Counsel. I was thus constrained to
elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

14. The
case pended at the Supreme Court for over ten (10) years. By 2001,
Carpio was appointed associate justice of the Supreme Court. In
2007, the Supreme Court, by ponencia
of then
Justice Dante Tinga, sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the libel case. It
dwelt on technicalities and simply said that I should have filed the
case in Muntinlupa City where I resided. I could have re-filed the
case subsequent to my receipt of the Supreme Court decision on the
case. However, before the Supreme Court came up with its decision,
principal accused Manapat died. One can only marvel at how deep and
extensive the research of author Maritess Vitug was in her book
“Shadow of Doubt: Probing the Supreme Court” on how some cases
are decided in the Supreme Court.

15. Lately,
after a series of public and publicized exchanges between me and some
members of “The Firm” on matters affecting good governance ――
particularly the acrimonious exchanges between me and respondent
Marcelo on May 20, 2010 in ABS-CBN’s morning show “Umagang Kay
Ganda” and after my filing of a libel charge against five partners
of The Firm ― the
“Smart File” publication suddenly resurfaced and once again
re-circulated with vengeful passion.
One does not have to be a genius to determine who are responsible
for the sudden re-circulation of the “Smart File” publication
which was first published
and circulated some 15 years ago.

The
perspective in which the attacks and smear campaign against Chavez
should be viewed.

______________________________

16. I
served as Solicitor General under extremely trying times. It was a
transition from the Marcos dictatorship to a regime of full
restoration of democratic rights and freedoms. I faced the daunting
task of assisting as legal counsel the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in the fulfillment of its mandate of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses under Executive
Order No. 1 issued by then President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino on
February 28, 1986. It was the PCGG that prepared the more than 40
cases for reconveyance and recovery of ill-gotten wealth with the
Marcoses as principal defendants and no less than 400 associates,
cronies and political allies as secondary defendants.

17. Together
with the PCGG initially, I ventured into the task of going to various
courts as Solicitor General to dismantle through legal processes the
remaining vestiges of the unlamented Marcos dictatorship. This
naturally entailed crossing swords with, and filing various cases
against, several hundreds of personalities in the broad spectrum that
included not only media but also business, political and social
personalities.

18.
My uncompromising discharge of duties as Solicitor General naturally
offended these people, some of whom had launched personal attacks and
smear campaigns to discredit me and my work and to emaciate the
strength of my conviction. Resultantly, there were many media
columnists who relentlessly criticized me, society bigwigs who spread
false rumors about me, politicians delivering privilege speeches
against me, court members castigating me for the independent position
I have taken in my cases, trumped-up charges filed by cowardly
anonymous persons who may have been offended when I purged the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) of misfits and the corrupt.

19. The
then unfolding scenario brought out such figures as Emil Jurado
(newspaper columnist and Marcos loyalist), Rodolfo Albano (KBL
stalwart and diehard Marcos fan), Juan Ponce Enrile (Martial Law
administrator), nameless “Concerned OSG employees” and a justice
of the Supreme Court who penned the decision in Gonzalez
v. Chavez
(205
SCRA 816). Respondents collated the critical statements of these
people and claim that I have a bad reputation ―― as if this was
license for them to defame me and justification for their libelous
statements against me. But how can the personal opinions, regard,
estimation, criticism of about ten people confer upon me a general
reputation? Ten persons (out of about 80 million Filipinos when the
criticisms were hurled at me 20 years ago) do not constitute the
critical mass of people sufficient to formulate and define my
reputation. In any event all, these matters which have ―― after
more than 20 years ―― now been resurrected by respondents
Angangco and Navarro in their counter-affidavits will be dealt with
and refuted correspondingly. I hasten to add that these
20-year old criticisms against me have no relevance whatsoever to the
libel charge against respondents — much less to their proffered
defenses.
But they have recycled these matters because of their insidious
motive to further besmirch my reputation, defame and embarrass me.
The Investigating Prosecutor could very well consider this as further
evidence of actual malice of respondents.

CONSOLIDATED

FACTUAL REFUTATIONS

20.
The Counter-Affidavits of respondents Villaraza, Cruz and Marcelo
will be refuted separately. The counter-affidavits of respondents
Angangco and Navarro are almost the same. They shall, therefore, be
treated jointly in my refutation of the matters treated therein.

Respondent
Villaraza’s Counter-Affidavit

21. Succinctly,
respondent Villaraza raises two defenses: (1) alibi,
as he was allegedly in Australia when the libelous article came out
and (2) my alleged ingratitude to him (as if this is a defense in
libel or a justification to malign and defame) because he allegedly
extended financial assistance to me when I was studying law in UP.

a) Alibi
in this case is a silly defense interposed by a primitive mind.
Villaraza claims he was in Australia when the libelous statement saw
print and therefore could not have conspired, plotted and agreed
with his co-respondents to issue the press statement sued upon. In
short, he claims impossibility of commission of the crime. There is
no impossibility of communication between Australia (unless he was
toying with Marsupials all the time) and Makati, where his office
is. Modern means of communication by teleconferencing, cellular
phones, skype, internet, laptops, can connect a person in Australia
to somebody in Makati in seconds.

b) Considering
that the libelous press statement issued by respondent Navarro could
provoke litigation, as it obviously did, the decision to have it
published was arrived at by respondents either in person or by phone
and/or other means of modern-day communication.

c) Villaraza’s
second defense (my ingratitude to him) is preposterous, ridiculous
and untrue. It is as if Villaraza is saying that since I turned out
ungrateful to him, he can malign and defame me. Such a claim could
only be conjured by a mind ravaged by habitual falsehood. His
allegation that he extended financial assistance to me when I
studied law in UP is the resultant offspring of his fractured mind
allowing his lie to elope with his imagination. No
such thing happened.

c.1) True,
I was hard up during my first year in law school, but I have
self-respect that forbids me from accepting doleouts, much less
from people I hardly know. In my first year, I stayed with my
aunt, even as I worked nighttime after night classes as
proofreader in a national magazine. In my second year, I obtained
the Kahirup
scholarship (funded by well-meaning Ilonggos) and a monthly
stipend from the late Congressman Felix
Amante, Sr.
of Negros Occidental. In my third and fourth years, I was the
exclusive recipient of a private scholarship grant from the late
philanthropist Don
Leodegario Agustin, Sr.
of Bacolod City and founder of West Negros College, where I
finished my pre-law course.

c.2) While
in UP, I never had any interaction with Villaraza as I was in law
school while he was still in Arts & Sciences. I finished law
in 1971,
while Villaraza finished in 1975.
The only thing I remember about Villaraza was that he caused a
frat war in the campus but was conspicuously missing at the scene
of action when fighting erupted.

c.3) Villaraza’s
pure concoction acquires no factual basis from the affidavit
executed by a certain Victor Fernandez (Fernandez, for brevity) ――
a known asslicker, protégé and puppet of Villaraza. Fernandez‘s
affidavit will be dealt with shortly herein.

c.4) Villaraza
is a brazen, blatant and inveterate liar and he knows it. Lying
has become second nature to him, it is not surprising he has
acquired the skills to hypnotize himself into believing his own
lies.

d) Villaraza’s
statements under oath are perjurious because they do not proceed
from his personal knowledge. His description of my personality, my
relationship with my parents, as well as my financial needs is not
only pure hearsay but absolutely untrue and certainly concocted.
Thus, Villaraza uses the following hearsay
statements:

i. He
“was
told
that Chavez was a destitute provinciano from Negros Occidental.”

ii. “Fernandez
said
…….”

iii. “Since
I
found out from frat brods.”

“dismayed
to learn…”

v. “The
brods described Chavez”

vi. “He
told some of the brods.”

Villaraza
tends to make up for his lack of personal knowledge by adverting to
an affidavit of his puppet Fernandez. Even so, it is clear that
it was Fernandez who was soliciting from Villaraza and probably from
other brods under the pretext of helping me and other “dirt-poor
brods.” Since not a single centavo reached me, it can only mean
no such money was raised or if funds were so raised, the funds never
reached me. Fernandez
may very well have diverted the money to someone else or something
else.
I remember that Fernandez, during our college days, was fond of
drinking sprees and giving blowouts. He could have used those funds
having good time with his inner clique among his brods.

e) It
is not true that I personally approached Villaraza asking him to
help me in the disqualification case against a certain Melchor
Chavez in the 1992 Senatorial elections. The law firm of Carpio
Villaraza and Cruz was the official legal counsel of Lakas-NUCD (the
political party founded by Fidel V. Ramos). When Melchor Chavez ran
for Senator in 1992, I brought the potential problem to the
attention of then presidential candidate Fidel Ramos and I told him
that I wanted to refer the matter to my old law firm: Sycip Salazar
Hernandez & Gatmaitan. Ramos, however, told me that the law firm
of Carpio Villaraza Cruz should do its job because it was the
official legal counsel of the political party. When the matter was
referred to the law office of Carpio Villaraza Cruz, the case was
assigned to Atty. Celia Librea-Leagogo (now a Justice of
the Court of Appeals). During all the time when the case was being
handled by Atty. Celia Librea-Leagogo, I never met Villaraza nor
discussed any aspect of the case with him, because I am sure he does
not know anything about election laws — only electoral foul play.

f) The
perjurious affidavit of Victor Fernandez

f.1) Fernandez,
I remember when we were in law school, had either a neck tic or
Tourette syndrome as he kept on twisting his neck on the sides
when he talked in high pitch, especially when he was excited, as
if he was being poked from the behind. I also thought to myself
that this guy must have been so pampered when he was a child he
had a hard time keeping his saliva from drooling down the sides of
his lips when he talked.

f.2) But
brushing aside these personal observations on this perjured
witness of Villaraza, Fernandez really has an axe to grind against
me.

f.2.1) In
1987, when I had just assumed my position as Solicitor General,
Fernandez approached me and insisted that I should help ――
and fast ―― in a case involving his mother-in-law, a former
mayor of Quezon City. I told Fernandez I will study the case on
the merits but that I cannot make an unqualified commitment to
help as I have not read the records yet. Fernandez mistook this
to mean I did not want to help his mother-in-law. He stood up,
left my office in a huff but only after telling me: “May araw
ka rin, Frank.”

f.2.2) In
July 1988, when I was still Solicitor General, I exposed the
anomalies committed by the PCGG. This led into an open, public
fight between me and the PCGG Chairman and Commissioners. By
reason of the exposé, President Corazon Aquino removed all PCGG
Commissioners, including its Chairman. Some time in 1992/1993,
the ousted PCGG Chairman filed a disbarment case against me, in
obvious retaliation. That disbarment case was assigned to
Fernandez as IBP hearing officer. Fernandez was hell bent on
either having me disbarred or suspended. It was providential
another classmate and fraternity brod informed me that Fernandez
was formalizing his Resolution for my disbarment ――
reportedly upon the behest of Carpio/Villaraza due in all
probability to incidents stated in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11
hereof. To my mind, this was just an added factor because
Fernandez wanted to make good his threat “may araw ka rin,
Frank.”

f.2.3) I
immediately filed a motion for Fernandez’s inhibition. His
evil intention exposed, Fernandez inhibited himself. The case
was eventually dismissed by the IBP.

f.2.4) Years
later, upon sponsorship of Carpio/Villaraza, Fernandez was
appointed Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. It was during the time
when respondent Marcelo was Ombudsman. In May and June 2004, I
filed four (4) plunder charges against GMA, et al. Since Marcelo
did not move in the premises against GMA, I filed a motion for
his inhibition. Marcelo inhibited but he passed the cases on to
Fernandez. Since Fernandez is respondents’ satellite/puppet,
Fernandez mastered the difficult art of doing nothing about the
cases against GMA. The cases never moved.

g) Fernandez
ought to be ashamed of himself when he says that I “would never
have finished my law school were it not for, among others, the
generosity of the very person (I am) suing, Villaraza.” This is
the very first time — since
43 year ago — that
the matter about Fernandez and Villaraza allegedly helping me
financially while in law school has ever been relayed to me. No
such information had been conveyed to me all these years by
Villaraza and Fernandez: not during the entire law course, not
during frat meetings, not during frat balls, not during class
reunions. Not at all. The gall in such claim can only be equalled
by its baselessness.

g.1) I
may have been a financially impaired student in my first year at
the UP College
of Law but I could not be categorized as “dirt-poor.”
“Dirt-poor” are the squatters, the scavengers, the pushcart
vendors and the slum dwellers. I never wallowed in abject poverty
nor “constantly whined about the abject poverty of (my) family
in Negros.” While I was not proud of being poor, I was not
ashamed of it. I consider it a circumstance I had to accept and
to unshackle myself from. I never blamed my parents who I deeply
love, adore, respect and idolize to this very day. In fact, just
recently (March 2010), Quezon City Councilor Winnie Castelo
launched a book entitled “FILIPINO
ACHIEVERS, On Their Heroes”
which includes my undying accolade to my father, Ladislao
Locsin Chavez,
who I regard as my hero, my idol and my role model. Copy of the
cover of Coun. Castelo’s book is attached hereto as Annex
“B”
and the corresponding pages thereof containing the write-up about
my father under my authorship is attached as Annexes
“B-1,” “B-2,” “B-3,” “B-4,” “B-5,” and “B-6.”

g.2) Fernandez
said that I repeatedly told my brods in law school, including
him, that I “would never forgive (my) father for being poor.”
Fernandez therefore expressed complete surprise as to why I refer
to my father in my 28 page resume as a “well decorated war hero”
and to my mother as a “well-loved public school teacher and
mother of 10.” The truth is, I never told any of my brods,
including Fernandez, about not being able to forgive my father for
being poor. There simply was nothing to forgive. It never
happened and the reason why I praise both my parents in my resume
is because it is
consistent with the truth.
Fernandez’s surprise is only consistent with a brazen lie. In
refutation of paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of Fernandez’s affidavit, I
adopt my sworn statements indicated in paragraphs 21.c.1 and
21.c.2 hereof.

g.3) Habitual
falsehood can cause baldness. Fernandez is lying through his
teeth when he said I received significant amount from the
scholarship fund from Sigma Rho which, according to him, included
tuition, monthly allowance, book allowance and dorm expenses for
my 3^rd
to 4^th
years at UP College of Law. Such features of a scholarship from
the Sigma Rho would obviously have surpassed the most generous
scholarship then available for law students: The Carlos P. Romulo
Law Scholarship. There was no such thing as a Sigma Rho
scholarship, much less with the features described by Fernandez.
As I have explained in refutation of Villaraza’s statements, I
stayed with my aunt and worked after my night classes, during my
first year; in my second year, I got the Kahirup
scholarship and a monthly stipend from the late Cong.
Felix Amante, Sr.
of Negros Occidental. In my 3^rd
and 4^th
years, I was the only recipient of the Don
Leodegario Agustin, Sr.
scholarship, founder of West Negros College in Bacolod City where
I finished my pre-law course. Considering these scholarships, I
even had spare money to send home.
This was why I finished law (cum
laude)
without buying a single law book because I
was prioritizing expenses for my siblings.

g.4)
If there is one person who has really helped me while I was in law
school, it was our then Grand Archon, Alfonso “Boy” Reyno, Jr.
He exempted me from frat fees (or probably ended up paying the fees
for me), lent me law books and notes, treated me with compassion
and was solicitous over my general welfare like a real older
brother. And I will always remember and treasure brod Boy Reyno’s
help. There were a lot of Narra dorm brods who were good and kind
to me but who were not poor, as derisively and condescendingly
referred to by Fernandez and Villaraza ―― the hypocritical
elitists. My brods Allen Quimpo, Malcolm “Boy” Sarmiento,
Rodolfo “Ding” Aquino, the late Ed Azarraga, Oscar Gozos (my
classmates Mario Andres, Pit Lu, Hakim Abdul Wahid, Nelson Antolin,
Wilbert Candelaria, Leoncito de Lara, Antonio Gallardo, Oswald
Magno, Ric Marasigan, Noy Alfiler, Ted Marcelino, Joselin Diaz,
Jules Acuesta), and many more who stayed in Narra Residence Hall
were not “dirt poor.” They just had the good sense not to brag
about and flaunt money earned by their parents as Fernandez and
Villaraza did.

g.5) For
the information of Fernandez and Villaraza, and respondent members
of “The Firm,” all the 10 children of war hero Ladislao
Locsin Chavez
and public school teacher Minerva
Ibrado Chavez
are successful professionals: doctor, lawyer, nurses, engineer,
businessman, banker, artist and minister. Despite their hardship
in life, they strove to succeed. And they all did — exceedingly
well.

g.6) I
entered UP Law in June 1967 with no one knowing me. After a month
or thereabouts, I joined the fraternity. I was prevailed upon by
the fraternity to run as University Councilor of the UP Student
Council. I told the brods that I would not stand a chance because
nobody knows me in the campus. The fraternity nonetheless
insisted that I should run and they will attend to all logistical
requirements. For the same reason, the fraternity also inveigled
another brod, Eleazar Reyes, to run along with me and dubbed us
“The Summa Cum Laude Twins.” I won in that election and
became a member of the UP Student Council. Unfortunately, brod
Ely Reyes did not make it. It is not true that I asked the
fraternity to support me in that election. It was the other way
around, considering that the circumstances of my candidacy were
dictated by the fraternity.

g.7) Simply
because Fernandez does not remember that I was awarded “UP Man
of the Year in 1969” does not mean that I never received such
award or that such an award did not exist. He can perhaps get
information from another brod, Victor “Boy” Lazatin who, at
one time, was also a recipient of this award.

g.8) Fernandez
also expresses complete disappointment and considers it an extreme
insult that I did not even acknowledge that I am a member of the
Sigma Rho Fraternity in my Biodata, or that my “brods were
responsible for putting (me) to law school.” I will always be a
Sigma Rhoan whether it is printed in my Biodata or not. I believe
in the hierarchy of loyalty of the Sigma Rho Fraternity ――
God, Country, University and Fraternity. Unfortunately for
Villaraza and Fernandez, their actuations once they left
law school, totally desecrated
this hierarchy. They put themselves not only above the
fraternity, above the university, above the country but even above
God because money has become their master, power their ultimate
aim and greed their motivation. I undertake, nonetheless, to
eventually include the Sigma Rho in my Biodata once it shall have
purged itself from the likes of Fernandez, Carpio, Villaraza,
Cruz, Marcelo and Angangco, who have, through the years,
relentlessly smeared the good name and reputation of the Sigma Rho
to the utter consternation and dismay of the majority of its
members.

g.9) Fernandez
and Villaraza proceed on the distorted belief that if they helped
a person (but in fact they have not helped me at all), that person
can no longer expose their wrongdoing. Both of them should
realize that because they sneer and jeer at the poor, the long arm
of karma
will embrace them in the fullness of time.

g.10) Lastly,
Fernandez thinks he has intellectual distinction because, he
claims, he was a member of the Order of the Purple Feather of the
UP College of Law. Big deal! He can cover his body with all the
feather he wants until he turns purple but that would not
camouflage his mediocrity and weakness of character.

Counter-Affidavits
of respondents Cruz and Marcelo

______________________

22. Like
the Counter-Affidavits of the other respondents, there is not much
credible and accurate factual and legal assertions in the
Counter-Affidavits of respondents Cruz and Marcelo.

Like
respondent Villaraza, respondent Cruz raises the defense of alibi, as
he was also allegedly abroad when the libelous statement sued upon
was published and that the DOJ has no jurisdiction over the present
charge for libel because, respondent Cruz claims, the complaint
should have been filed with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati.

As
to respondent Cruz’s first defense, I adopt my refutation of a
similar defense mentioned by Villaraza as my refutation of Cruz’s
defense. In respect of respondent Cruz’s second defense, I
likewise adopt by reference all the refutations set forth herein on
the issue of jurisdiction/venue in the filing of my libel complaint
before the DOJ — particularly the allegations set forth under the
heading “Consolidated Refutations of Legal Arguments Raised By
Respondents.”

23. Respondent
Marcelo has not joined issue with me in respect of the allegations
set forth in my Complaint-Affidavit, except to pat himself on the
back by saying that I virtually cleared him because I acknowledged
that the press statement of respondent Navarro was for and in behalf
of the partners in “The Firm” who have never held public office.
Marcelo claims that since he held public office, he should not be
considered as part of the group of respondent Navarro, et al. Such
shallow reasoning deserves no consideration at all. It fails to
address my allegation that he and the other name partners in “The
Firm” conspired, plotted and agreed to publish the press statement
with the obvious intention of subjecting me to ridicule,
embarrassment and defamation.

Counter-Affidavits
of respondents Angangco and Navarro

_________________________

24. Respondents
Angangco and Navarro are hopeless grave-diggers. In an obvious
attempt to recycle long-resolved issues, which only underscores their
actual malice to malign and besmirch my reputation, respondents
Angangco and Navarro resurrect over 20-year old stale and resolved
issues against me. Underscoring their malice is their deliberate
omission to reveal that all these cases had already been resolved and
DISMISSED
by the proper government offices more
than 20 years ago.

25. In
reckless disregard of the truth, respondents Angangco and Navarro
claim that charges of graft and corruption were made by my own
subordinates at the OSG against me. What these respondents do not
know is that during my first two months at the OSG (March-May 1987),
I dismissed from service no less than five (5) OSG lawyers for proven
dishonesty in service. Thereafter, an anonymous letter, enumerating
trumped-up charges against me, was circulated and eventually reached
the Office of the Tanodbayan. What these respondents deliberately
suppressed is the fact that these accusations were from anonymous
persons (hiding under the cowardly label “Concerned OSG
Employees”). Rising above these accusations are the steadfast
resolutions, letters and manifestos signed by all the Assistant
Solicitors General at that time, their respective lawyers within
their teams and the non-legal staff of the OSG. In these expressions
of trust, confidence and support for me, the
entire workforce of the OSG rallied behind me and castigated those
who falsely accused me.
Copies of these 23-year old resolutions/letters/manifestos are
attached hereto as Annexes
“C’, “C-1,” “C-2,” “C-3,” C-4,” “C-5,” “C-6,”
“C-7,” “C-8,” “C-9,” “C-10,” “C-11,”
“C-12,” “C-13,” “C-14,” “C-15.”

26. What
respondents Angangco and Navarro also deliberately suppressed ―
further proving their actual malice — is that all these accusations
against me had long been dismissed by then Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez
(upon recommendation of Special Prosecutor Juan Templonuevo and OIC,
Investigation & Prosecution Office Jose De G. Ferrer) per
Resolution dated December
10, 1987
(copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
“D,”
consisting of 6 pages).

27. What
respondents Angangco and Navarro also deliberately suppressed is the
fact that an attempt to revive these baseless charges suffered the
same fate. It was dismissed
by Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzalez by Resolution dated
April
15, 1988
(attached hereto as Annex
“E”).

28. A
second attempt to revive these trumped-up charges was also foiled by
another Resolution dated August
11, 1988
submitted by Prosecutor Fidel Galindez and approved by Special
Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzalez (copy attached hereto as Annex
“F”)

29. Respondents
Angangco and Navarro also resurrected the privilege speech against me
by Cong. Rodolfo Albano, delivered on February 6, 1992.
Rodolfo Albano was a staunch Marcos loyalist and defender. He
waited for my last day in office as Solicitor General when he
delivered his privilege speech. Again, what respondents Angangco and
Navarro deliberately suppressed was the fact that all the accusations
made by Rodolfo Albano were dismissed by Order dated April
21, 1992
(copy attached hereto as Annex
“G”)
issued by then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez. Again these same
trumped-up accusations made up by Rodolfo Albano were dismissed and
considered closed and terminated by a Fact-Finding Report issued by
then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez dated June
16, 1992
(copy attached hereto as Annex
“H”
consisting of 5 pages).

30. It
is a matter of record that before Rodolfo Albano delivered his
privilege speech on February 6, 1992, he had earlier taken me to task
for my actuations at the OSG. This prompted me to write him a letter
dated February
26, 1992
(copy attached hereto as Annex
“I”
consisting of 6 pages). Before that, I sent Rodolfo Albano a letter
dated March
5, 1990
(copy attached hereto as Annex
“J”)
enclosing therein a letter dated February
22, 1990
addressed to me by a Cagayano detailing Rodolfo Albano’s
accomplishments as follows:

“His
accomplishments at the present time:

1. With
his son as Mayor, he controls illegal logging in Cabagan and San
Pablo;

2. Openly
operates besides his gate ‘JUETENG’ hiding under the umbrella
of the STL;

3. Manipulates the
buying and distribution of carabaos and cows to his goons;

When
he stayed as Undersecretary of Agriculture, he borrowed hundreds
cows and not returned to the government; dictated Director Lasa, DA;

Controls
ferries, tobacco industry, palay, cine and lahat ng negosio sa amin.

He
sold two (2) cars which he borrows from Bureau of Customs in 1983.
Caught many time by Anti-Carnap team for fake plates and papers of
cars. Please investigate all these activities of Albano.”

A
copy of the aforesaid letter dated March 5, 1990 is hereto attached
as Annex
“J-1.” Rodolfo
Albano never answered these two letters (Annexes “J” and “J-1”).

31. Now
that elections are over and the hypocritical support of their partner
respondent Cruz for then presidential candidate Noynoy Aquino can be
exposed, respondents Angangco and Navarro dig up the 30-year old
Hacienda
Luisita case
— a
case which involves the family of now President Noynoy Aquino. They
rely on a privilege speech delivered on June
8, 1989
by then Sen. Juan Ponce-Enrile (Martial Law administrator) on how I
allegedly managed to cause the dismissal of the case that was
obviously won by the government. For the information of respondents,
I was counsel for Reli German, who, along with 12 others were charged
with libel by Juan Ponce-Enrile — accusing them in connection with
claimed anomalies in the acquisition of some units of Sykorski
helicopter. (German was acquitted). When I was appointed Solicitor
General, I included Juan Ponce-Enrile as respondent in the ill-gotten
wealth recovery cases and made him a secondary defendant, with the
Marcoses as principal defendants. Of course, Enrile so resented this
that he sought to include me in his counterclaim for damages before
the Sandiganbayan for my lawyering for the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) and making him a respondent in the recovery
cases. This case against me was dismissed by the Supreme Court
(Chavez
v. Sandiganbayan and Juan Ponce-Enrile,
193 SCRA 282). I will refrain from reciting additional points of
conflict I had in the past with Enrile as they have nothing to do
with recycled matters respondents Angangco and Navarro now seek to
maliciously resurrect.

32. The
Hacienda Luisita case was dismissed not by me as Solicitor General.
It is a matter of record that the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and the Land Bank as lenders to the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TADECO) and the heirs of the late Jose Cojuangco, Sr.
withdrew their respective claims on Hacienda Luisita — with the
conformity of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). As Solicitor
General, I simply attached to a Manifestation the respective letter
withdrawals made by GSIS and Land Bank and the conformity of the DAR.
The Court of Appeals subsequently, on the bases thereof, dismissed
the case.

33. Manila
Standard
has always been the launching pad of adverse criticisms hurled
against me by its old guard, Emil Jurado. Jurado has never written
anything good about me. He can do so as he pleases (within the
bounds of protected freedom, of course) because I do not really care
about his opinion or regard of me.

34. Respondents
Angangco and Navarro obviously derive pleasure reading and utilizing
in their Counter-Affidavits the case of Gonzalez
vs. Chavez (205
SCRA 816).

34.a) Gonzalez
v. Chavez
should be taken and read in the context of the events that
transpired four years before its promulgation.

34.b) As
mentioned somewhere in this Consolidated Reply, in July 1988, I
exposed various anomalies committed by certain officials of the
PCGG. As a result of that expose, the PCGG Chairman and all the
Commissioners were removed by Pres. Corazon C. Aquino. Among those
removed and suddenly rendered jobless was the husband of Justice
Flerida Ruth Romero, ponente
of
Gonzalez v. Chavez.
Justice Romero should have inhibited herself since the case would
have provided, as in fact it did, an opportunity for her to get back
at me for what happened to her husband. She did not inhibit. And
so Gonzalez
v. Chavez,
was written the way it was. To my mind, Gonzalez
v. Chavez
was a clear departure from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Orbos
v. CSC
(189 SCRA 459) encouraging, congratulating and endorsing the
independent positions I have taken as Solicitor General in various
cases involving government offices and institutions. It was my
clear understanding that, by mere abstraction, Government can do no
wrong. But public officials can, in fact, commit error, commit
crimes, inflict oppression and do injustice.

34.c) Clearly,
the Supreme Court in Orbos
case recognized this and that is why in clear unmistakable English,
the Supreme Court said:

“In
the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it that
the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set
by law.
When confronted with a situation where one government office takes
an adverse position against another government agency, as in this
case, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his
duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to
present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although
it may run counter to a client’s position.
In such an instance the government office adversely affected by the
merits of this case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal
personnel or representative.

xxx xxx xxx

This
is not the first time that the office of the Solicitor General has
taken a position adverse to his clients like the CSC, the National
Labor Relations Commission, among others, and even the People of the
Philippines. In
such instances, the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his
opinion and recommendation to the Court which is an invaluable aid
in the disposition of the case. On some occasions he begs leave to
be excused from intervening in the case, more so, when the client
had already filed its own comment different from the stand of the
Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds the contention of
a private party tenable as against that of the government
or any of it agencies. The Solicitor General has recommended the
acquittal of the accused in appealed criminal cases.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed,
the assistance of the Solicitor General should be welcomed by the
parties. He should be given full support and cooperation by any
agency or official involved in litigation. He should be enabled to
faithfully discharge his duties and responsibilities as the
government advocate. And he should do no less for his clients. His
burden of assisting in the fair and just administration of justice
is clear.

This
Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the
performance of his duty. As a matter of act, the Court appreciates
the participation of the Solicitor General in many proceedings and
his continued fealty to his assigned task. He
should not therefore desist from appearing before this Court even in
those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the Government or
any of its agents he is expected to represent.
The Court must be advised of his position just as well.”

35. Respondents
Angangco and Navarro likewise utilize the 1992 privilege speech of
Rodolfo Albano, then congressman, in questioning the transfer of my
residence to Ayala Alabang Village. I could afford to transfer to
that village because I have honestly saved up after working for 16
years in the biggest and most prestigious law firm in Asia — Sycip
Salazar Feliciano Hernandez and Gatmaitan. Anyway, I once again
refer respondents Angangco and Navarro to Annexes “D,” “E,”
“F,” “G,” and “H” of this Consolidated Reply Affidavit
because all of these charges as earlier stated were dismissed and
thrown to a place they rightfully belong: the garbage.

36. Lastly,
the gravediggers also resurrect the tirade against me by then Sen.
Wigberto E. Tanada on the services I rendered for Security Bank and
Trust Co. in 1994, when I was no longer in government service. It
has to be pointed out that Security Bank had earlier been cleared by
PCGG circa 1986 – 1987.
There is, in fact, a PCGG certification that the Zamora brothers
(Ronaldo Zamora, included) were not cronies of Marcos. How this came
about, I do not know. In any event, the
money returned to Security Bank was never marked as part of the
Marcos hidden wealth.
It was clearly documented. It was Security Bank’s own untainted
money. The documents submitted proved this point and that is why
Taňada’s accusation never gained ground, never took off. Like all
the baseless accusations against me, it died a natural death.

37. A
Biodata or curriculum vitae (loosely translated as “the course of
my life”) sets forth significant highlights in a person’s life on
his various fields of endeavor, commitment and activities.
Respondents are clearly pettifogging when they even take issue on
some of the entries in my curriculum vitae. Thus, they take issue
with my song recording because they cannot sing — they can only
croak. They take issue with my service to others through Rotary
because they think only of themselves. They make light of my record
as a champion combat shooter because they cannot shoot straight.
They likewise take issue with my being a long distance runner because
they cannot run ―― they can only walk. They make light of the
novel I wrote because they do not have the talent for creative
writing. They misleadingly say I refer to myself as Batman, Superman
and Spiderman rolled into one — deliberately suppressing the fact
that those attributes were described by blurbist Pete Lacaba to
describe a character in my novel. They belittle my record as a human
rights advocate because they are the defenders of human rights
violators. They take issue with my researches eventually used by
students in their term paper because they do not know how to read
beyond ten words. They make light of my streetfighting days because
they do not know how to fight fair and square. Surely, respondents
must be torn between admiration and envy.

CONSOLIDATED
REFUTATIONS

OF
LEGAL ARGUMENTS

RAISED
BY RESPONDENTS

——————————————

CONTRARY
TO RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE AS ITS POWER TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NATIONAL IN SCOPE.

RESPONDENTS’
LAME EXCUSE THAT THE WORDS “UNBLEMISHED BY VICTORY” WERE NEVER
MENTIONED BY RESPONDENT NAVARRO CANNOT ABSOLVE THEM FROM
LIABILITY; FOR, IN LIBEL CASES, ANY EXPLANATION MADE BY THE
SPEAKER OR AUTHOR OF THE LIBELOUS STATEMENT IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT.

III

CONTRARY
TO RESPONDENTS’ ALLEGATIONS, BOTH MALICE IN LAW AND MALICE IN
FACT EXIST AS TO WARRANT THEIR INDICTMENT FOR LIBEL.

RESPONDENTS
CANNOT INVOKE SELF-DEFENSE AS THE STATEMENT THAT MY TRACK RECORD
IS “UNBLEMISHED BY VICTORY” WAS NOT MADE TO REPAIR, MINIMIZE
OR REMOVE THE SUPPOSED EFFECT OF ANY ALLEGED DAMAGE BUT SOLELY FOR
THE PURPOSE OF DEFAMING AND MALIGNING ME.

DISCUSSION

CONTRARY
TO RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE AS ITS POWER TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NATIONAL IN SCOPE.

38. In
their Counter-Affidavits,
respondents Angangco, Navarro and Cruz — chorused in by other
respondents — claim that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the instant case. According to them, the instant
Complaint-Affidavit
should have been filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City where the subject statement was printed and first
published and where I reside.

39. Don’t
respondents do not know that all Offices of the City Prosecutors
nationwide are under the control and supervision of the Department of
Justice (Visbal
vs. Sescon,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1890, 11 October 2005)? Reading skills may have been
abandoned for more profitable undertakings.

40. The
DOJ is both the prosecution arm and legal counsel of the State.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Department of Justice has
the power to investigate crimes and prosecute offenders. Thus,
according to Section 1, Chapter 1, Book IV of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987:

“Section
1. Declaration
of Policy.
— It is the declared policy of the State to provide the
government with a principal law agency which shall be both its
legal
counsel and prosecution arm;
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation
of the crimes,
prosecution
of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; implement the laws
on the admission and stay of aliens, citizenship, land titling
system, and settlement of land problems involving small landowners
and members of indigenous cultural minorities; and provide free
legal services to indigent members of the society.” (Emphasis
supplied)

41. Furthermore,
Section 3, Chapter 1, Book IV thereof provides that:

“Section
3. Powers
and Functions.
– To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following powers and functions:

(1) Act
as principal law agency of the government and as legal counsel
and representative thereof, whenever so required;

(2) Investigate
the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders
and administer the probation and correction system;

(3) Extend
free legal assistance/representation to indigents and poor
litigants in criminal cases and non-commercial civil disputes;

(4) Preserve
the integrity of land titles through proper registration;

(5) Investigate
and arbitrate untitled land disputes involving small landowners
and members of indigenous cultural communities;

(6) Provide
immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement
the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of
aliens;

(7) Provide
legal services to the national government and its functionaries,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and

(8) Perform
such other functions as may be provided by law.” (Emphasis
supplied)

42. Obviously,
the DOJ has the power to conduct Preliminary
Investigation
of the instant case. Indeed, the fairly recent case of Judy
Anne Santos vs. People
(563 SCRA 341 [2008]) is applicable herein. There, as in this case,
the Complaint
was filed with the Department of Justice. Like in this case, the
question of jurisdiction arose. The Supreme Court, in that case,
ruled that the DOJ may validly take cognizance of the said case.
Thus:

“In
contrast, the DOJ is the principal law agency of the Philippine
government which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution
arm. It
has the power to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and correction system.
Under the DOJ is the Office of the State Prosecutor whose
functions are described as follows:

(1) Assist
the Secretary in the performance of powers and functions of the
Department relative to its role as the prosecution arm of the
government;

(2) Implement
the provisions of laws, executive orders and rules, and carry out
the policies, plans, programs and projects of the Department
relative to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases;

(3) Assist
the Secretary in exercising supervision and control over the
National Prosecution Service as constituted under P.D. No. 1275
and/or otherwise hereinafter provided; and

(4) Perform
such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the
Secretary.

As
explained by CTA First Division in its Resolution dated 11 May
2006:

[T]he
power or authority of the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño,
Jr. and his deputies in the Department of Justice to prosecute
cases is NATIONAL
IN SCOPE;
and the Special Prosecutor’s authority to sign and file
informations in court proceeds from the exercise of said person’s
authority to conduct preliminary investigations.” (Emphasis
supplied)

43. Indeed,
there can be no question that the DOJ’s power to conduct
Preliminary
Investigation
and prosecute cases is NATIONAL
IN
SCOPE.

44. In
fact, respondents cannot claim that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the instant Complaint-Affidavit.
For, respondent Angangco’s very own Complaint-Affidavit
dated 10 June 2010, docketed as NPS Docket No. XV-05-INV-10F-01625 is
also now pending before the DOJ. Respondent
Angangco himself asked that the said case be consolidated with the
instant case.

45. In
order to support their allegation that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to
entertain the instant Complaint,
respondents Angangco and Navarro cite the cases of Agbayani
vs. Sayo
(89 SCRA 699 [1979]) and Guyud
vs. Pine
(395 SCRA 26 [2003]).

46. But
said respondents’ reliance on the said cases is PATENTLY
MISPLACED.
For, not one of the Complaints
in the said cases were filed with the DOJ.

47. First,
in the case of Agbayani
(supra),
the respondent therein was the GSIS Branch
Manager
of Cauayan, Isabela. However, the Complaint
for libel against him was filed in Nueva
Ecija.
Naturally, the said case was filed in the wrong venue. For, being a
public officer, a criminal case for libel should have been filed in
the province or city where he held office.

48. Unlike
the DOJ, the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Nueva Ecija’s jurisdiction is not national in scope. Hence, the
said Complaint
was naturally dismissed.

49. On
the other hand, in the case of Guyud
(supra),
the respondent therein was the Presiding
Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Echague, Isabela. He conducted
Preliminary
Investigation
over a libel Complaint
despite the fact that the Echague is not the capital of Isabela.
Naturally, he was held administratively liable. For, Preliminary
Investigation
of libel cases may be conducted by MTC Judges of the capital of the
province in which the criminal action may be filed.

50. Again,
the Complaint
therein was not filed with the DOJ. Hence, the said case is clearly
inapplicable to the present case.

51. Here,
it bears reiteration that the jurisdiction of the DOJ to conduct
Preliminary
Investigation
is national
in scope.
Hence, the DOJ clearly has jurisdiction over the instant case.

52. In
their respective Counter-Affidavits,
respondents Navarro, Villaraza, Cruz, Marcelo and Angangco all claim
that the subject statement is not defamatory because, according to
them, the phrase “unblemished
by victory”
is nowhere to be found in the subject statement. Said respondents
further claim that what they stated was that my record was
“unblemished”
and that the words “unblemished
by victory”
was merely an innuendo, which I added.

53. But
this is obviously nothing but a lame excuse in order to escape
liability.

“UNDER
FIRE FROM CRITICS FOR purportedly positioning itself to grab an
influential role in the incoming Aquino administration, the
Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco Law Office yesterday hit back
at one of the fiercest of those critics.

The
office known as ‘The Firm’ accused former Solicitor General
Frank Chavez of trying to win — at their expense — an
appointment in the Cabinet of President-apparent Benigno Aquino
III as the secretary of justice.

‘There
is no excuse for attorney Chavez’s bitter tirades against The
Firm,’ said senior partner Alejandro Alfonso E. Navarro in an
interview with the Inquirer.

‘No good and
justifiable motives can possibly be behind this — only
professional jealousy or perhaps an eye toward the DOJ post, or
both, can put some sense into his bizarre and irrational fixation
with The Firm,’ he said.

Eyeing
DOJ

Chavez
has accused senior members of the Villaraza law office of
positioning themselves for plum posts in the next administration,
specifically Avelino Cruz, Jr. who, he claimed, is eyeing the
justice portfolio, and former Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo who
purportedly wants to be appointed to the Judicial and Bar Council.

Navarro
said that instead of attacking The Firm, Chavez should simply send
his resume’ to Aquino’s search committee ‘so that it may
stand side by side with those partners of The Firm he deludes
himself to be equal with.’

‘His
resume’ should include, for proper perspective, his record as
solicitor general, which has been unkindly called ‘unblemished’
by those in the know,’ HE
SAID, ALLUDING TO THE DERISIVE PHRASE ‘UNBLEMISHED BY VICTORY’
USED TO DESCRIBE LAWYERS WITH A POOR TRACK RECORD.

Navarro,
who said he was speaking on behalf of all lawyers of The Firm who
have not held public office, said there was ‘nothing new’ in
Chavez’s latest attacks.

Vintage
Frank Chavez

‘The malice and
viciousness of language is vintage Frank Chavez,’ he said. ‘The
timing of these attacks is also not surprising. It is appointments
season for the incoming administration and demolition jobs against
perceived appointments to government are par for the course.’

Navarro urged Chavez
to direct his criticism at The Firm’s partners who had held
public office while sparing the rest of the law office’s
partners.

‘A
line has to be drawn when libel extends to private individuals and
firms,’ he said. ‘Attorney Chavez has crossed that line’.”
(emphasis supplied)

54. Well-settled
is the rule that, in libel cases, the meaning of the writer or
speaker is IMMATERIAL
and IRRELEVANT.
It is not the intention of the writer or speaker which is material
but the meaning that the words in fact convey on the minds of persons
of reasonable understanding and candor, taking into consideration the
surrounding circumstances which were known to the hearer or reader.^¹

55. As
early as 1914, the Supreme Court, in the case of Jimenez
vs. Reyes
(27 Phil 52 [1914]), already laid down the rule that, in libel cases,
the meaning of the writer or speaker is immaterial. Thus:

“As
to the effect to be given an alleged libelous article, Townshend
on Slander and Libel, has the following to say: ‘the
sense in which the publisher meant the language CANNOT
BE
MATERIAL.
The dicta which apparently sanction such a rule will, on a
comparison with their context, by found in reality to be, not what
did the defendant mean, but what properly may he be taken to have
meant.
How might the language be understood by those to whom it was
published. It
cannot, therefore, be correct to say that the language is to be
construed in the sense in which the publisher intended it to be
understood,
‘When a party has made a charge that clearly imputes a crime, he
cannot afterwards be permitted to say, I did not intend what my
words legally imply."

In
Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (190 Minn., 341),
the court had the following to say on this point: ‘’In
determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two
rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That
construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense
in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered.
(2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed
as a whole.” (Emphasis supplied)

56. In
the case of Sazon
vs. Court of Appeals
(255 SCRA 698 [1996], the Supreme Court specifically stated that
“[i]n
libel cases,
the
question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means,
but what
the words used by him mean”.

57. In
the case of MVRS
Publications vs. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines
(396 SCRA 210 [2003]), Justice Austria Martinez, in a well written
dissenting opinion, correctly stated that:

“Significantly,
liability
for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on
the fact of the defamation.
In matters of libel, the
question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but
what is the meaning of the words he has used.
The
meaning of the writer is quite IMMATERIAL.
The question is, not what the writer meant, but what he conveyed
to those who heard or read.

In
other words, it
is not the intention of the speaker or writer, or the
understanding of the plaintiff or of any particular hearer or
reader, by which the actionable quality of the words is to be
determined. It is the meaning that the words in fact conveyed,
rather than the effect which the language complained of was fairly
calculated to produce and would naturally produce on the minds of
persons of reasonable understanding, discretion, and candor,
taking into consideration accompanying explanations and
surrounding circumstances which were known to the hearer or
reader.
The alleged defamatory statement should be construed not only as
to the expression used but also with respect to the whole scope
and apparent object of the writer.

Want
of intention to vilify does not render an objectionable
publication any the less a libel and a publication is not excused
by the publisher’s ignorance that it contains libelous matter.
The
state of mind of the person who publishes a libel is immaterial in
determining liability. The law looks at the tendency and
consequences of the publication rather than the motive or
intention of the writer or publisher.
It does not signify what the motive of the person publishing the
libel was, or whether he intended it to have a libelous meaning or
not. The defendant may not have intended to injure the plaintiff’s
reputation at all and he may have published the words by mistake
or inadvertence, or in jest, or without intending to refer, or
knowing that he was referring, to the plaintiff, or any existing
person, or again he may have been actuated by the best motives in
publishing the words, but such facts will usually afford the
defendant no defense, though they may be urged in mitigation of
damages.” (Emphasis supplied)

58. In
fact, in libel cases, any explanation offered by the publisher or the
speaker will be disregarded. Thus, in the fairly recent case of
Yuchengco
vs. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation
(605 SCRA 684 [2009]) — a case again incorrectly relied upon by
respondents Angangco and Navarro — the Supreme Court clearly stated
that:

“We
are not swayed by the explanations of respondents Cabrera and
Valino. In
determining the defamatory character of words used, the
explanation of the respondent should not prevail over what the
utterances (or writing) convey to an ordinary listener (or
reader).
Furthermore, as held by this Court in United States v. Sotto:

‘[F]or
the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged
to be libelous ‘that construction must be adopted which will
give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the
plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally
understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be
libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these rules to
the language of an alleged libel, the
court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered
by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question
being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the
readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered
explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the
effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used
in the publication.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

59. Furthermore,
in the same case of Jimenez,
cited above, the Supreme court stated that:

“In
applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the
court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered
by the publisher on being called to account.
The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the
minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the
offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to
have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the
words used in the publication.” (Emphasis supplied)

60. Respondents
keep on citing wrong cases — cases actually tearing down their
defenses. In the case of United
States vs. O’Connel
(37 Phil 767 [1918] — another case relied upon by respondents
Angangco and Navarro to supposedly show that the subject statements
are not libelous — the Supreme Court clearly stated that:

“Defendant
has imputed nothing wrong to the complainants in certain and
express terms. But this is not necessary. Words calculated to
induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy
reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A
charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the
hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or
are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.
Said Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:

‘The
rule is a sound one that the law cannot shut its eyes to what all
the rest of the world can see; and let the slanderer disguise his
language, and wrap up his meaning in ambiguous givings out, as he
will, and it shall not avail him, because courts will understand
language, in whatever form it is used, as all mankind understands
it.’

Said
another court much more recently:

‘The
test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into
component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or
stylist, but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language
to the ordinary reader.”
(Emphasis supplied)

61. Here,
it is obvious that the subject statement is DEFAMATORY,
notwithstanding respondents’ lame excuses and poor explanations.

62. As
stated, in libel cases, the question is not what the writer meant,
but what he conveyed to those who heard or read. One must determine
the effect which the statement would naturally produce on the minds
of persons of reasonable understanding, discretion, and candor,
taking into consideration accompanying explanations and surrounding
circumstances which were known to the hearer or reader.

63. Here,
it is obvious that — notwithstanding the fact that, as respondent
Navarro claims, he did not specifically mention the words
“unblemished
by victory”
— that was what he meant. And the article sued upon in fact
carries those words and meaning.

64. How
can respondents make such a claim when, respondent Angangco himself,
in his Counter-Affidavit,
ADMITTED
the phrase “unblemished”
is automatically understood by the public as meaning “unblemished
by victory”.
Indeed, respondent Angangco, in his Counter-Affidavit
clearly stated that “complainant
Chavez, like so many others, automatically
equates ‘unblemished’ with ‘unblemished by victory’
when used to describe himself”.^²

65. Clearly,
respondents know that when the word “unblemished”
was uttered, the hearers and readers thereof would automatically
understand it as meaning “unblemished
by victory”.
This is especially true since, as respondents themselves also
admitted, the words “unblemished
by victory”
had already been used by others to defame and malign me.^³

66. Indeed,
even the author of the subject article, respondent Lucas, perfectly
understood that when respondent Navarro used the word “unblemished”,
he clearly meant “unblemished
by victory”.
Thus, according to the subject article:

“His
resume should include for proper prospective, his record as
solicitor general, which has been unkindly called ‘unblemished’
by those in the know’, he (respondent Navarro) said, alluding
to the derisive phrase ‘unblemished by victory’ used to
describe lawyers with a poor track record.”
(Emphasis supplied)

67. Obviously,
persons of reasonable understanding, discretion, and candor would
naturally understand the word “unblemished”
as meaning “unblemished
by victory”.
Respondents cannot now turn around and say that the word
“unblemished”
should not be understood to mean “unblemished
by victory”.

III

CONTRARY
TO RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATIONS, BOTH MALICE IN LAW AND MALICE IN
FACT EXIST AS TO WARRANT THEIR INDICTMENT FOR LIBEL.

68. Respondents
Navarro, Villaraza, Cruz, Marcelo and Angangco, in their separate
Counter-Affidavits,
allege that I did not make any allegation to show or prove that the
subject statement was malicious.

69. Respondents
conveniently forget two (2) things.

70. First,
the instant case is still in the Preliminary
Investigation
stage. Hence, this is not the time within which to make full and
exhaustive display of evidence. To require me to present proof that
the subject statements were made with malice is to ask the
Investigating
Prosecutor
to conduct trial on the merits. Indeed, at this stage, the
Investigating
Prosecutor
need only to determine probable cause.

70.a) According
to the Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure:

Section
1. Preliminary
Investigation defined;
when
required
– Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)

70.b) It
is well-settled that the only issue to be resolved in the
Preliminary
Investigation
stage is whether
or not there is probable cause to hold respondent for trial.
Thus, in the case of Cruz
vs. People of the Philippines, et. al. [G.R.
No. 110436, 27 June 1994], the Supreme Court held that:

“It
must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial,
and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to
prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof,
and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in
jeopardy. The established rule is that a
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence;
it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.”
(Emphasis supplied)

70.c) In
the same case of Cruz
vs. People of the Philippines, et. al.,
the Supreme Court had occasion to define probable cause, to wit:

70.d)
Evidently, I need not prove malice beyond reasonable doubt at the
present time. The time within which to make full and exhaustive
display of evidence is when the present case is heard on the merits.

71. Second,
respondents also deliberately forgot that when the imputation is
defamatory, the prosecution NEED
NOT PROVE MALICE
on the part of the respondent. The law PRESUMES
that the respondent’s imputation is malicious.

71.a) According
to Article 354, Revised Penal Code:

“Art.
354. Requirement
for publicity.
— Every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown,
except in the following cases:

1. A
private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A
fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.”

(Emphasis
supplied)

71.b) This
is what is known as malice in law. In the case of Yuchengco,
cited above, the Supreme Court defined malice in law, as follows:

“xxx.
Malice in law is a presumption of law. It
dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise the
presumption are shown to have been uttered.
It is also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or
implied malice. xxx”

71.c) Here,
as stated above, the statements made by respondent Navarro, for and
in behalf of the other lawyer-respondents in the instant case, are
clearly defamatory. The said statement clearly indicates
respondents’ intention to make the public believe that I never won
a case during my term as Solicitor
General.
To a lawyer, such statement is clearly damaging. For, to a member
of the Bar, his reputation is everything. How could any lawyer
expect to continue practicing law when the public is baselessly made
to believe that he has not won a case at all?

71.d) No
good intention and justifiable motive for making such statements
were ever shown. On the contrary, as will later be discussed in
detail, the said statement was clearly made out of spite and
ill-will towards me. It is aimed for no other reason than to
besmirch my reputation as a lawyer. It is calculated to induce the
public into believing that my track record is supposedly
“unblemished
by victory”.

72. Respondents
Angangco and Navarro allege that malice in law is not present here,
although they ADMIT
that the subject statement does not fall within the exemptions
enumerated under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code^⁴.

72.a) According
to respondents, the said statement is a “fair
commentary on matters of public interest”,
which was made by a public figure. Hence, according to them, it is
also considered as qualified privileged communication.

72.b) It
may be true that, in the case of Borjal
vs. Court of Appeals
(301 SCRA 1 [1999]), the Supreme Court expanded the above-stated
enumeration of qualified privileged communications in Article 354 of
the Revised Penal Code to include “fair
commentaries on matters of public interest”.
However, the doctrine in Borjal does not give an absolute license
to anyone to smear the reputation of public figures involved in
matters of public interest. Thus, in the said case, it was stated
that:

“To
reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel
or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may
be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.” (Emphasis supplied)

72.c) Obvious
from the above-quoted case is the fact that, in order for “fair
commentaries on matters of public interest”
to be considered as qualified privileged communication, it must be
shown that it is neither a false allegation of fact nor a comment
based on a false supposition. This was explained by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tulfo
vs. People
(565 SCRA 283 [2008]). Thus:

“The
expansion speaks of ‘fair commentaries on matters of public
interest’. While Borjal places fair commentaries within the
scope of qualified privileged communication, the
mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or a
matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the
author from liability.
Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public
official to be actionable, it
must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition.
As previously mentioned, the trial court found that the
allegations against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not
exert effort to verify the information before publishing his
articles.” (Emphasis supplied)

72.d) In
that very same case of Tulfo,
the Supreme Court even stated that “[i]t
cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure would
always be covered by the mantle of qualified privileged
communication”.

72.e) Indeed,
the Supreme Court clearly stated that, for statements to be
considered qualified privileged communication they must be FAIR
commentaries of matters of public interest. The Supreme Court gave
emphasis to the word “fair”.
Thus, in the case of Tulfo,
cited above, the Supreme Court defined the word fair as “having
the qualities of impartiality and honesty”.

72.f) Hence,
even if I were a public figure and that the subject of the libelous
article is a matter of public interest, the same still cannot be
considered as qualified privileged communication for the very simply
reason that it is NOT
a fair commentary on a matter of public interest. It is a FALSE
ALLEGATION OF FACT
or, at the very least, A
COMMENT BASED ON A FALSE SUPPOSITION.

72.g) Contrary
to respondents’ allegations, my record is far from being
“unblemished
by victory”.
As stated in my Complaint-Affidavit,
I have WON
a considerable number of landmark cases that shaped the course of
Philippine jurisprudence as it stands today. I reiterate that I was
instrumental in winning seventy four (74) out of eighty one (81)
government and presidential policy cases, thus maintaining a winning
average of over 90% in cases before the Supreme Court. This
standing was achieved on PURE
MERITS,
as former President Corazon C. Aquino, who I served as Solicitor
General,
NEVER
EVEN ONCE
instructed me to talk to any magistrate of any court, let alone the
Supreme Court, to influence the outcome of any case. Respondent
Marcelo admitted on national TV/Radio that he talked to Supreme
Court Justice Antonio Carpio to influence the outcome of a case.

72.h) The
cases that I have won, which are recorded in the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and which will forever be etched in legal
history, include, among a plethora of cases, the following:
BASECO
vs. PCGG
(150 SCRA 181); Grand
Alliance for Democracy vs. COMELEC
(150 SCRA 665); Tio
vs. Videogram Regulatory Board
(151 SCRA 208);
Tablarin vs. Hon. Gutierrez, et. al.
(152 SCRA 730); Palm
Avenue vs. PCGG
(153 SCRA 579); Sarmiento
III vs. Mison (156
SCRA 549); Republic
vs. De los Angeles
(159 SCRA 264);
United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian (159
SCRA 446); PCGG
vs. Peña (159
SCRA 556); Zaldivar
vs. Gonzales
(160 SCRA 843); Century
Textile Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC
(161 SCRA 528); Citizens’
Alliance for Consumer Protection vs. Energy Regulatory Board
(162 SCRA 521); Harvey
vs. Defensor-Santiago
(162 SCRA 840);
Beltran vs. Executive Secretary
(167 SCRA 393); National
Economic Protectionism Association vs. Ongpin
(171 SCRA 657); CIR
vs. Antonio Tuason, Inc.
(173 SCRA 397); Frivaldo
vs. COMELEC
(174 SCRA 245); Albano
vs. Reyes
(175 SCRA 264); Acuña
vs. Arroyo (175
SCRA 343); Labo,
Jr. vs. COMELEC (176
SCRA 01); University
of the Philippines vs. Judge Ayson
(176 SCRA 571);
Marcos vs. Manglapus
(177 SCRA 668); Tejada
vs. Homestead Property Corp.
(178 SCRA 164); Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. vs. PCGG
(178 SCRA 236); Abbas
vs. COMELEC (179
SCRA 287); Del
Rosario vs. Bengzon (180
SCRA 521); Yaokasin
vs. Commissioner of Customs
(180 SCRA 591); Cordillera
Broad Coalition vs. COA
(181 SCRA 495); Guanzon
vs. De Villa
(181 SCRA 623); SSK
Parts Corp. vs. Camas
(181 SCRA 675); Republic
vs. Court of Appeals
(182 SCRA 290); Acting
Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig &
Makati vs. RTC – Makati, Branch 57
(184 SCRA 622); Kimberly
Independent Labor Union vs. Drilon (185
SCRA 190); Valmonte
vs. De Villa
(185 SCRA 665);
Umil vs. Ramos (187
SCRA 311); Metropolitan
Traffic Command vs. Gonong (187
SCRA 432); People
vs. Inting
(187 SCRA 788); PNCC
vs. Republic
(188 SCRA 775); Orbos
vs. Civil Service Commission (189
SCRA 459); PLDT
vs. NTC
(190 SCRA 717);
Maceda vs. ERB
(192 SCRA 363); Chavez
vs. Sandiganbayan
(193 SCRA 282); Achacoso
vs. Macaraig, Jr.
(195 SCRA 235); Silverio
vs. Court of Appeals
(195 SCRA 760); Guingona,
Jr. vs. Carague (196
SCRA 221);
Elepante vs. Madayag (196
SCRA 399);
Basco vs. PAGCOR
(197 SCRA 52); Maceda
vs. Macaraig, Jr.
(197 SCRA 771);
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal (199
SCRA 692); Comendador
vs. De Villa
(200 SCRA 80); Ganzon
vs. Court of Appeals
(200 SCRA 271); MPSTA
vs. Laguio, Jr.
(200 SCRA 323); Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan
(200 SCRA 667); Cayetano
vs. Monsod (201
SCRA 210);
Llamas vs. Orbos
(202 SCRA 844); Evardone
vs. COMELEC
(204 SCRA 464); Cariño
vs. Commission on Human Rights
(204 SCRA 483) and Garcia
vs. Executive Secretary
(204 SCRA 516).

72.i) Also,
after serving as Solicitor
General,
I continued to win important and landmark cases before the Supreme
Court which include, among
others,
the cases of: Chavez
vs. PCGG
(299
SCRA 744); People
vs. Abe Valdez
(341
SCRA 25); Chavez
vs. PEA-Amari
(384
SCRA 152; 403 SCRA 1; 415 SCRA 403); Chavez
vs. Drilon, et al.
(415 SCRA 44); Chavez
vs. Ermita
(488
SCRA 01); and Chavez
vs. Gonzalez, National Telecommunications Commission
(545 SCRA 235).
I also obtained the acquittal of Fr. Robert Reyes who was charged
with rebellion in connection with the Manila Peninsula Hotel
incident on 29 November 2007. I also secured the acquittal of the
so-called “Tagaytay
5”.
In all of these cases, I never made money as they were all pro-bono
— handled as taxpayer and citizen in representation of the
oppressed, the defrauded and the abused.

72.j)
Obviously, respondents’ claim that my record is “unblemished
by victory”
is purely a FALSE
ALLEGATION OF FACT
or, at the very least, A
COMMENT BASED ON A FALSE SUPPOSITION.
It cannot therefore be considered a “fair
commentary on matters of public interest”.
Hence, it is not a qualified privileged communication. And, for
this reason, the presumption of malice in law must be upheld.

73. But
even assuming arguendo
that malice in law does not exist, there is still malice in fact.

73.a) Malice
in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It
may denote that the defendant was actuated by ill will or personal
spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real
malice, true malice, or particular malice (Yuchengco
vs. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation,
supra).

73.b) Thus,
the Supreme Court, in that case of Yuchengco,
stated that:

“Malice
connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed,
and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous
remarks made
such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.”
(Emphasis supplied)

73.c) Respondents
had long harbored ill will and spite against me. For, I had been at
the forefront of fighting graft and corruption. I could not
tolerate any abuse of power or influence peddling. And because
respondents’ “The
Firm”
had been at the forefront of such corrupt practices, our paths often
crossed.

73.d) As
mentioned, sometime in 1992 to 1993, I already had a conflict with
the so called “The
Firm”
and its partners. This was during the Oriental Petroleum proxy
fight. At that time, I was representing Robert Coyuito while “The
Firm”
represented Alfonso Yuchengco. Carpio was then Presidential
Legal Counsel.
And he coerced and influenced several stockholders and directors of
Oriental Petroleum so that these stockholders and directors would
then issue proxies in favor of their client. The proxies would end
up in the hands of Villaraza.

73.e) As
mentioned, I confronted Carpio about the matter. It turned out to be
a heated exchange. In fact, it reached a point when it almost
turned out to be a physical confrontation. But despite the fact
that I stood up and held my ground standing, Carpio remained frozen
in his seat. We won the proxy fight despite “The
Firm’s”
illegal tactics. But this was the start of a long conflict between
myself and the so-called “The
Firm”.

73.f) Just
a few months after the said incident, our law firm had another
encounter with “The
Firm”.
This was the Chemphil fight between brothers Antonio and Ramon
Garcia. “The
Firm”
represented the former while we represented the latter. We were
able to secure a Temporary
Restraining Order
(“TRO”, for brevity) for and in behalf of Ramon Garcia. And, by
virtue thereof, we took over the Chemphil building and premises
located along Pasay Road, Makati City.

73.g) For
about a week, our client was in possession of the said premises.
But then, a composite team of policemen and soldiers, with the
support of a war tank — upon the obvious intervention of a
Malacanang Official — took over the Chemphil premises.

73.h) It
was after these incidents that an undated issue of “Smart File”
designated only as “Animal
Farm Series 028 and 029”
was published and circulated extensively. Antonio Carpio’s hand
in the circulation and publication of this “Smart File” was
obvious. For, it was written by a certain Ricardo Manapat, who was
reportedly a close associate of then Presidential
Legal Counsel
Antonio Carpio. The said publication had no other purpose than to
besmirch my good name and cause me ridicule.

73.i) I
sued Manapat for libel, with at least one John Doe reserved for
Carpio. The City Prosecutor of Manila found probable cause and
accordingly filed the Information
for libel against Manapat and John Does before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. The accused moved to quash the warrants for their
arrest. When the court denied their motion, the accused went to the
Court of Appeals. The said court then issued a Decision
in favor of the accused. At that time, Carpio was still the
Presidential
Legal Counsel.
I was thus constrained to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.
The case pended at the Supreme Court for over ten (10) years. By
2001, Carpio was appointed Associate
Justice
of the Supreme Court. In 2007, the Supreme Court, by ponencia
of
then Justice Dante Tinga, sustained the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the libel
case. It dwelt on technicalities and simply said that I should have
filed the case in Muntinlupa City where I resided. I could have
re-filed the case subsequent to my receipt of the Supreme Court
decision on the case. However, before the Supreme Court came up
with its decision, principal accused Manapat died.

73.j) Lately,
there had also been conflict between myself and “The
Firm”
on matters affecting good governance. One particular incident was
the heated exchanges between me and respondent Marcelo on 20 May
2010 in ABS-CBN’s morning show “Umagang
Kay Ganda”
where Marcelo clearly expressed his spite and ill-will against me.

73.k) Now,
and after my filing of a libel charge against five partners of “The
Firm”,
the “Smart File” publication suddenly resurfaced and once again
re-circulated with vengeful passion. Again, it is obvious that this
is part of a smear campaign started by respondents herein. This
should be considered as further proof of respondents’ actual
malice towards me.

73.l) Obviously,
respondents-lawyers herein had long harbored spite and ill-will
against me. The claim that my record is “unblemished
by victory”
is just part of this smear campaign to destroy my reputation and
blacken my good name.

73.m)Respondent
Navarro, when he spoke for and in behalf of the other
respondents-lawyers herein — that my record was supposedly
“unblemished
by victory”
— cannot deny that he had knowledge of the falsity of such
statements. For, being practicing lawyers, respondents could not
possibly have missed the plethora of cases which I have won and
which formed part of the present jurisprudential doctrines.

73.n) That
respondents were well aware of my victories is obvious from
respondent Angangco’s very own Complaint-Affidavit.
There, he even explained the issues involved in the cases of
Beltran
vs. Court of Appeals,
supra;
People
vs. Inting,
supra;
Chavez
vs. Sandiganbayan,
supra;
Silverio
vs. Court of Appeals,
supra
and BASECO
vs. PCGG,
supra.^⁵

73.o) How
could respondent Angangco now claim that there is any truth to the
statement that my record is “unblemished
by victory”
when he himself read the said cases and can even remember and
explain to the Investigating
Prosecutor
the issues involved therein? Respondent Angangco clearly made such
remarks WITH
KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS FALSE.

73.p) But
respondents Navarro and Angangco seemed to have realized that they
could not deny the fact that I have won several important cases.
Thus, in order to squeeze themselves out of their sorry situation,
they now claim that when they mentioned the phrase “unblemished
by victory”,
they actually meant that I have “never
been able to successfully pursue a recovery case against the
Marcoses with finality and recover specific assets or amounts in
favor of the government”.

73.q) But
again, this is nothing more than an ingenious explanation of the
authors of the libelous statement. As explained above, these
ingenious explanations should not even be considered by this
Honorable Investigating
Prosecutor.
For, as mentioned above, any explanation of the speaker is
IRRELEVANT
in libel cases. This is especially true in the instant case where
it is obvious that the phrase “unblemished
by victory”
means that I supposedly never won any case before. Respondents
clearly try to make it appear that I had been losing all the cases I
had handled. This, for no other purpose than to cause my disrepute.

73.r) This
statement was made out of pure spite and ill will. To claim that a
lawyer has never won any of the cases he handled is clearly
derogatory. It is most damaging to my reputation as a lawyer. For,
how could a lawyer continue to practice law when the entire public
is made to believe that he cannot win cases for them?

73.s) The
said statement is clearly MALICIOUS!
IV RESPONDENTS CANNOT INVOKE SELF-DEFENSE AS THE STATEMENT THAT MY TRACK RECORD IS “UNBLEMISHED BY VICTORY” WAS NOT MADE TO REPAIR, MINIMIZE OR REMOVE THE SUPPOSED EFFECT OF THE ALLEGED DAMAGE BUT SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFAMING AND MALIGNING ME.

74. Respondents
Angangco and Navarro claim that they could not be indicted for libel
as they were supposedly acting in self-defense. According to
respondent Navarro, “the
publication of the subject statement was made in defense of the honor
and reputation of CVCLAW and its partners who never held public
office”.^⁶

75. But
this claim is patently wrong. Well-settled is the rule that, for
self-defense to be a valid justification for libel, the defendant
should
not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him.
Thus, in the case of Guinguing
vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 128959, 30 September 2005), it was stated that:

“xxx.
The purpose of self-defense in libel is to repair, minimize or
remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not
license the defendant to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language
in return for what he received. Once
the defendant hits back with equal or more scurrilous remarks
unnecessary for his defense, the retaliation becomes an
independent act for which he may be liable.
xxx.” (Emphasis supplied)

76. Here,
respondents could not possibly invoke self-defense. According to
them, I supposedly accused them of “influence
peddling”
and “transaction
litigation”.
Hence, they allegedly had reason to defend themselves.

77. But
what did they do? Instead of trying to repair, minimize or remove
the supposed effect of the alleged damage which I supposedly caused,
they publicly claimed that I am a lawyer with a track record
“unblemished
by victory”.
What does this statement have to do with their “influence
peddling”
and “transactional
litigation”?
In
fact, nowhere in the subject statement did they even deny that they
are involved in such “influence
peddling”
and “transactional
litigation”.
They did not even try to explain their side.

78. THE
CLAIM THAT MY TRACK RECORD IS SUPPOSEDLY “UNBLEMISHED
BY VICTORY”
IS CLEARLY UNNECESSARY FOR ANY DEFENSE.

79. Clearly,
respondents are not defending themselves. They are maligning me.
They are involved in a smear campaign which has no other purpose
than to cause my disrepute not only before the legal community but
before the general public.

SUMMATION

I
respectfully submit that the following considerations should be taken
into account in the DOJ’s finding of probable cause to indict all
of herein respondents for libel.

First,
I
have never criticized the so-called “The Firm,” much less any of
its partners and associates who have never held public office. There
was, therefore, no basis for any of the lawyers of “The Firm” not
alluded to in issuing the libelous statement against me.

This
is clear in my letter dated May 21, 2010 (copy attached hereto as
Annex
“K”)
addressed to respondent Navarro who claims he was authorized by the
partners of “The Firm” to issue the questioned press statement.
I
never directed my criticism to any of the partners of “The Firm”
who never held public office.
I have absolutely no control over the reference of reporters to
respondents Cruz and Marcelo (who held public offices) as belonging
to “The Firm.” Thus, in
all the articles alluding to “The Firm,” the context of the
stories reported in the papers was always confined to the activities
of respondents Cruz and Marcelo
── nobody else from “The Firm.”

Second,
In
the counter-affidavit submitted by respondent Raoul Angangco, which
he said should be considered as his counter-complaint for libel
against me, he shamelessly and unthinkably, along with the other
respondents, take pride in calling their law office “The Firm” ──
a clear takeoff from John Grisham’s novel “The Firm,” which
pejoratively chronicles the shenanigans of gangsters, money
launderers, tax evaders, corporate raiders and murderers masquerading
as lawyers. Since they insist on being referred to as “The Firm,”
they deserve the reputation they have generated.

Third,
In
all their counter-affidavits, respondents Angangco, Villaraza, Cruz,
Marcelo and Navarro DO NOT DENY that they engage in “influence
peddling” and “illegal transactions.” They likewise do not
deny that the City Prosecutor of Makati is their “protegé, ally,
collaborator and protector.” They, however, insist that I should
have nonetheless filed the case before said city prosecutor and asked
for his inhibition. Why should I engage in such exercise in futility
and frustration, knowing that I would not stand a Chinaman’s chance
before that city prosecutor? I decided to file the case before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) considering that the DOJ has overall
jurisdiction, authority, administrative and review powers over all
prosecutors in the country. As a matter of fact, the city prosecutor
of Makati recognizes this overall authority when he inhibited himself
from the libel charge filed against me before his office by
respondent Navarro and endorsed the case to the DOJ, where it now
pends.

Fourth,

The issue of jurisdiction comes into play only when an Information
for libel is filed in court. After all, Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code refers to a COURT,
not a prosecutor’s office. If a libel charge is filed by a Makati
resident and probable cause is found by the DOJ but the Information
is filed in Manila, then jurisdiction/venue is questionable. If,
however, the Information is filed in Makati, there could be no
question on jurisdiction.

Fifth,
Even
as respondents Navarro, Villaraza, Cruz, Marcelo and Angangco
question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the libel charge that I
filed, they nonetheless submitted their counter-affidavits before the
DOJ. Since they have become legal legends in their own minds, they
should have questioned the DOJ’s jurisdiction before the
appropriate court. By filing their counter-affidavits with the DOJ,
the respondents in fact recognize and submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the DOJ and, by seeking relief therefrom, asked the
DOJ to exercise said jurisdiction.

Sixth,

Respondents are now changing their position. They now deny having
said that my record as Solicitor General was “unblemished by
victory.” But such denial is belied by the very article published
and sued upon. They also claim that there is no malice either in
law or in fact, in the publication complained of, as it was
qualifiedly privileged, claiming that I am a public figure. The
actual malice in respondents’ libelous statement is clearly
established by their reckless disregard of readily verifiable facts,
figures and data of my record as Solicitor General. Actual malice is
present in respondents’ own admission that the libelous statement
sued upon was their vengeful reaction to the acrimonious exchange
between me and their partner, respondent Marcelo, during the TV
program “Umagang Kay Ganda” last May 20, 2010.

Seventh,
Even
as respondents deny responsibility for their libelous statement, they
nonetheless insist that I had “poor performance as a Solicitor
General in respect of the government’s recovery efforts of the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.” Now respondents admit that I in
fact won at least 59 cases ── a complete turnaround from their
libelous statement that my record is “unblemished by victory.”
But they denigrate such victories because, according to them, none of
such cases resulted in actual and final recovery of the Marcoses’
ill-gotten wealth in favor of the government. If it were so, then
all Solicitors General from 1986 to the present (including respondent
Marcelo) belong to that rating because up to now there is no “final
recovery” of the Marcos wealth. This is of course a cross-eyed
argument that has to be straightened out.

Eighth,
The
Solicitor General is the principal counsel of the government,
representing its agencies and offices and some government
corporations and government financing institutions in cases before
our courts. The
Solicitor General is not mandated to recover ill-gotten wealth.
During my time, I did so only as counsel for the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Under Executive Order No. 1
issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino on February 28, 1986, it
is the PCGG
── not the Solicitor General ── which
has the mandate of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

Ninth,
In
any event, the records show that I successfully steered the legal
team in Switzerland composed of lawyers from Zurich, Geneva and
Freiburg in obtaining 100% legal victories in the government’s
effort to recover the Marcoses’ wealth before the Judges of
Instruction, the Cantonal District Courts and the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court. Through my effort, the Swiss Investigating Magistrate
issued on February 6, 1992, a permanent freeze order against all the
Marcoses’ assets in Switzerland. On December 17, 1991, I filed a
Forfeiture Petition against the Marcoses on behalf of the Republic.
This case was eventually decided in favor of the government on July
15, 2003 by then Justice (now Chief Justice) Renato Corona ──
yes, the same justice who had been the object of a smear campaign
from some partners of the so-called “The Firm” who were pushing
for Justice Antonio Carpio to become chief justice.

Lastly,
instead of focusing on their defenses, the respondents went out of
their way to resurrect and recycle old issues and cases against me
that had been dismissed
by the proper government offices about 23 years ago. Respondents
never even volunteered the information that all such issues and cases
had been resolved/dismissed — a clear indication of their actual
malice and evident intention to malign me and besmirch my reputation.
There is therefore sufficient bases in finding probable cause
against all respondents and for indicting them for the crime of
libel.

I
am executing this Consolidated
Reply-Affidavit
to attest to the truth of the foregoing statements and to have
respondents indicted for the crime of libel.

AFFIANT
FURTHER SAYETH NOT.

Francisco
I. Chavez

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED
AND SWORN to before me this
13^th
day of July 2010 at the Department of Justice, City of Manila.

THEODORE
M. VILLANUEVA

Senior
State Prosecutor

CERTIFICATION

I
further certify that I have personally examined the affiant and that
I am satisfied that he has executed this Consolidated
Reply-Affidavit freely and
voluntarily and has understood the contents hereof of his own
personal knowledge.

THEODORE
M. VILLANUEVA

Senior
State Prosecutor



Copy furnished:
villaraza cruz
marcelo and angangco
Counsel for Respondents Alejandro Alfonso E. Navarro, F. Arthur L. Villaraza, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Simeon V. Marcelo and Raoul R. Angangco
118 Perea St., Legaspi Village, Makati City, Metro Manila

ORTEGA
DEL CASTILLO BACORRO

ODULIO
CALMA & CARBONELL

Counsel for Respondent Daxim L. Lucas
Pergentino B. Bandayrel, Jr.

140 L.P. Leviste St.,
Salcedo Village

Makati City

1
Luis B. Reyes, the Revised Penal Code, Book II, Fifteenth Edition,
p. 933 [2001]

2
Respondent Angangco’s Counter-Affidavit,
par. 33, p. 20

3
Par. 42.7, id

4
(1) a
private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
(2) a fair
and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

5
Paragraphs 73.1 to 74, respondent Angangco’s Counter-Affidavit,
pages 44 to 45

6
Paragraph 75, page 45 Respondent Navarro’s Counter-Affidavit

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